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Abstract
More than a third of the World Trade Organization (WTO)-notiﬁed services trade
agreements (STAs) in eﬀect over January 2008 - August 2015 have involved at least one
(South or Southeast) Asian trading partner. Drawing on Baier and Bergstrand's (2004)
determinants of preferential trade agreements and using the World Bank's database on
the restrictiveness of domestic services regimes (Borchert et.al. 2012), we examine the
potential for negotiated regulatory convergence in Asian services markets. Our results
suggest that countries within Asia with high levels of pre-existing bilateral merchandise
trade and wide diﬀerences in services regulatory frameworks are more likely candidates
for STA formation. Such results lend support to the hypothesis that the heightened
serviciﬁcation of production generates a demand for the lowered service input costs
resulting from negotiated market opening.
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1 Introduction
One of the striking features of trade diplomacy in recent years has been the seemingly un-
stoppable march of preferential trade liberalization and rule-making (Kawai and Wignajara
2010). Such a trend is now extending to services, most spectacularly of late in the Asia-
Paciﬁc region (Chanda 2011, PECC and ADBI 2011, Shepherd and Pasadilla 2012). Of the
81 preferential trade agreements (PTAs) in force prior to January 2000, 73 (90%) featured
provisions dealing exclusively with trade in goods. Since then, 124 of the additional 194
PTAs that have entered into force up until August 2015 also include provisions on services
trade. The above trends signal the heightened importance of services trade in general, the
growing need among countries to place such trade on a ﬁrmer institutional and rule-making
footing, and the attractiveness of doing so on an expedited basis via preferential negotiating
platforms (Sauvé and Shingal 2011). Interestingly, more than one-third (28) of the 78 World
Trade Organization (WTO)-notiﬁed services trade agreements (STAs) in eﬀect since January
2008 and up until August 2015 have involved at least one South or Southeast Asian trading
partner.
Unlike trade in goods, where the removal of border barriers retains signiﬁcant negotiating
traction, domestic regulation is the sole currency of negotiations in services trade (Mattoo
and Sauvé 2010). The importance and potentially trade- and investment-inhibiting impact
of domestic regulation on service sector performance has received signiﬁcant attention in
policy research circles (Kox and Nordas 2007 and 2009). However, less well understood and
investigated has been the question of whether certain countries are more likely candidates
for negotiated regulatory convergence from a services trade perspective. Simply put: are
countries that display greater ex-ante regulatory convergence more likely candidates for
deeper integration agreements in services markets? Is the demand for negotiated market
opening a by-product of what has been dubbed the serviciﬁcation1 of production? What is
the role of geography in trade-facilitating regulatory convergence in services? And can the
presence of signiﬁcant developmental or institutional capacity gaps impede integration and
convergence in services markets?
This paper seeks answers to the above questions in an Asian2 setting. According to the
WTO's Regional Trade Agreements Information System (RTA-IS), 103 PTAs entered into
eﬀect during January 2008August 2015. A vast majority of these (exceeding 70% of WTO-
1For a fuller discussion of serviciﬁcation, see National Board of Trade (2012).
2For the purpose of this paper, Asia comprises Bangladesh, Cambodia, the People's Republic of China,
India, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philip-
pines, Thailand, and Viet Nam. These are the countries for which information on services regulation is
available in the World Bank's Services Trade Restrictiveness Index (STRI) database (Borchert et.al. 2012).
notiﬁed agreements) include provisions that cover both goods and services trade. Twenty-
eight of the 78 STAs notiﬁed over January 2008-August 2015 involve at least one Asian
trading partner, and 11 of these have been entered into with another partner from Asia.
Clearly then, Asian economies have been at the forefront of the burgeoning trend toward
services preferentialism, oﬀering a potentially fertile setting for exploring this paper's core
research questions.
Regulatory heterogeneity has been shown to exert a signiﬁcantly negative impact on bilateral
services trade via Mode 3 (commercial presence) (Kox and Nordas 2009) and commercial
presence is the most dominant mode of service delivery, accounting for 55%60% of all
services trade ﬂows. We would thus expect trading partners in a services accord to exhibit
lower levels of regulatory heterogeneity compared to those not party to such an agreement.
Interestingly, this is not found to be true for the Asian economies studied in this paper. The
causal links actually run in the opposite direction.
Regulatory approximation or convergence thus appears as one of the main objectives of
negotiated services agreements rather than its chief determinant: the greater the extent of
regulatory heterogeneity between trading partners, the more likely are they to enter into
a services agreement to promote trade- and investment-facilitating regulatory convergence.
Signiﬁcantly, this proposition is validated by the empirical analysis undertaken for our sample
countries, also lending support to the hypothesis that serviciﬁcation trends  the heightened
share of services value added in ﬁnal production  generate demands to lower the services
costs that may arise from regulatory heterogeneity.
2 Related literature
Services preferentialism has spawned three strands of literature to date. A ﬁrst strand has
investigated the trade eﬀect of services accords on aggregate and disaggregated services
trade ﬂows, using advanced estimation techniques3 from the rapidly evolving gravity model
empirical literature (Park 2002, Francois and Hoekman 2009, Grunfeld and Moxnes 2003,
Kimura and Lee 2004, Lennon 2009, Marchetti 2009, Shingal 2014a, 2014b, van der Marel
and Shepherd 2011, Walsh 2006).
A second strand has explored the impact that diﬀering levels of (and heterogeneity in)
regulation exert on bilateral services trade ﬂows (Francois et al. 2007, Fink 2009, Kox and
Lejour 2006, Kox and Nordas 2007 and 2009, Schwellnus 2007, van der Marel and Shepherd
3An elaboration of these techniques is beyond the scope of this paper but an excellent review is provided
in Head and Mayer (2013).
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2011). A third strand has resorted to theoretical and empirical techniques to estimate barriers
to trade in services and foreign direct investment (FDI), and/or provide estimates of services
trade costs (Francois et al. 2007, Miroudot et al. 2010 and 2012, van der Marel 2011).
The literature has also evolved to explain services commitments in the GATS (Roy 2011),
those made reciprocally (Marchetti et al. 2012) as well as GATS+ commitments in STAs
(Van der Marel and Miroudot 2012).
The papers closest to ours are Baier and Bergstrand (2004), who were the ﬁrst to examine
the determinants of partners' propensities to negotiate PTAs, and Cole and Guillin (2015)
and Egger and Wamser (2013), who explored this issue for services accords. The latter two
papers, however, did not consider regulatory convergence as a determinant for entering into
negotiations. Studying the role of regulatory convergence is thus the main contribution of
this paper. This is done through recourse to a new World Bank dataset on measures of
services (regulatory) restrictiveness, the STRI (Borchert et.al. 2012)4.
Baier and Bergstrand (2004) found the potential welfare gains and likelihood of a PTA in
goods trade between a pair of countries to be higher: (i) the closer in terms of distance two
trading partners are; (ii) the more remote they are from the ROW; (iii) the larger and more
similar they are economically (in terms of real GDPs) to enable exploitation of economies of
scale in the presence of diﬀerentiated products; (iv) the greater is the diﬀerence in relative
factor endowments between them, leading to HeckscherOhlin trade; and (v) the smaller is
the diﬀerence in relative factor endowment ratios of the member countries relative to those of
the ROW (leading to less inter-industry trade diversion). Baier and Bergstrand (2004) found
these factors to have economically and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects on the probability of
negotiating a goods agreement.
In comparison, Cole and Guillin (2015) examined a dyad's propensity to negotiate a ser-
vices agreement and in their baseline speciﬁcation found statistically signiﬁcant evidence
only for the natural trading partner hypothesis, similarity in terms of economic size, and
relative factor endowment diﬀerences - both those emanating from HeckscherOhlin trade
and those leading to less inter-industry trade diversion. Egger and Wamser (2013) found the
determinants of goods and services trade agreements to be similar.
4See the World Bank's STRI database at http://iresearch.worldbank.org/servicetrade/home.htm
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3 Regulation in services trade
Regulatory measures aﬀect cross-border trade and investment in services by increasing both
the ﬁxed cost of entering a market and the variable cost of servicing that market. Where
regulation is destination-speciﬁc, such costs can become sunk, which makes the decision
to export similar to an investment decision, and involves a self-selection process studied in
the heterogeneous ﬁrm trade literature (Melitz 2003; Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple 2004;
Bernard, Redding, and Scott 2007; Chaney 2008). Essentially, only ﬁrms with the highest
productivity and/or lowest marginal costs tend to proﬁtably overcome sunk market-entry
costs, thereby self-selecting themselves into becoming exporters.
In the context of an STA, regulatory requirements assume signiﬁcance for ﬁrms in both
markets and the objective of the agreement is usually two-fold: (i) to bring down the level
and incidence of restrictive regulation in both markets; and (ii) to promote convergence and
approximation (including through mutual recognition), and ultimately (but less frequently
and successfully) to harmonize regulatory practices between trading partners.
The measure of regulation in services markets used in this paper is the Services Trade
Restrictiveness Index (STRI) recently released by the World Bank. Compiled from responses
to questionnaires sent out by the World Bank to 79 developing countries on impediments
to international integration, and from publicly available information for Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, STRI is a quantitative index
of restrictions on services trade encompassing 103 countries, 5 major service sectors, and 19
sub-sectors. The information is also available by modes of service delivery.
A comparison of STRI by regions and groups in Table 1 shows that the Middle East and
North Africa (MENA) has the most restrictive services trade policies, followed by South Asia
(SA), East Asia and the Paciﬁc (EAP), and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), with the last also
being the most heterogeneous cohort. As expected, OECD countries and Eastern Europe
and Central Asia (ECA ) not only report the lowest STRI values but also form the most
homogeneous cohorts. Signiﬁcantly, the Asian region is not only very restrictive but also
highly heterogeneous in terms of services trade impediments, which again makes it a relevant
case study for the purposes of this enquiry.
<Insert Table 1 here>
A closer look at Table 1 provides an intuitive feel for the factors likely to make countries
potential candidates for negotiated regulatory convergence. For instance, high levels of per
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capita income, economic development, and political stability all likely contribute to the
observed homogeneity in STRI among OECD countries despite signiﬁcant diﬀerences in
language, culture, and distances within this cohort. In the case of ECA, on the other hand,
there is greater homogeneity of language, culture, and distances, though more diﬀerences
in terms of per capita income and economic development. This seems to suggest that a
combination of these factors could determine which countries are potential candidates for
negotiated regulatory convergence.
4 Empirical methodology
Our empirical framework draws on McFadden's (1975 and 1976) qualitative choice models,
where utility, here the (minimum or average) net gains for two countries from participating
in an STA, is modeled as a latent, unobservable variable (y∗), which can be explained by a
vector of explanatory variables (x). Since y∗ cannot be observed, an indicator variable STA
is used which takes the value 1 (indicating y∗ > 0) if two countries participate in a common
STA and 0 (indicating y∗ ≤ 0) otherwise.
More formally,
STAij = 1ify∗ > 0andP (STAij = 1) = P (y∗ > 0) = G(α + βxij) (1)
where P is the response probability associated with a trading dyad (ij) signing a services
accord; G(.) is a cumulative distribution function that ensures that P (STAij = 1) lies in the
unit interval; and xij is the vector of explanatory variables for a generic country pair.
Consistent with Baier and Bergstrand (2004), empirically, (1) is estimated by a probit model,
assuming normality about the error term in the latent process. Clearly, independent of the
assumed cumulative distribution function, the non-linear nature of G(.) implies that the
coeﬃcient estimates only reveal the signs of the partial eﬀects of changes in xij on the
probability of signing a STA. Thus, the direction of the eﬀect of variable xk on E(y ∗ |x) =
α+ βx is only qualitatively (not quantitatively) identical to the eﬀect of xk on E(STA|x) =
G(α + βx), where E(.) denotes the expectation operator.
As a robustness check, however, we also estimate (1) using the Linear Probability Model
(LPM).
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5 Explanatory variables
In their seminal work exploring the determinants of partners' propensities to negotiate bilat-
eral trade agreements, Baier and Bergstrand (2004) documented that distance, remoteness,
economic country size, and relative factor endowments were the main economic determinants
of goods trade agreements membership and that their impact on empirical membership prob-
ability was consistent with economic theory. Following them, we use a largely overlapping
set of determinants in our empirical analyses.
For any dyad ij, we include DISTij which is the log of bilateral distance between i and j.
Economic country sizes are represented by SRGDPij, which is the sum of the logs of real
GDP of country i and j and DRGDPij, which is the absolute value of the diﬀerence between
the logs of real GDP of two countries.
DKLijand DROWKLij determine the role of factor endowments in countries' propensities
to negotiate agreements. DKLij is the absolute value of the diﬀerence between the logs of
capital-labour ratios of country i and j. Apart from DKLij, Baier and Bergstrand (2004)
suggest using SQDKLij  the squared value ofDKLij  in order to control for the likely non-
linear impact of DKLij on the net gains from participating in a trade agreement. Moreover,
to account for dependence of i and j on each other, Baier and Bergstrand (2004) suggested
including DROWKLij which is calculated as the absolute value of the diﬀerence between
the logs of capital-labour ratios of countries i and j and those of ROW.
Formally, DROWKLij= 12
[{
log
(∑N
k=1,k 6=iKk∑N
k=1,k 6=i Lk
)
− log
(
Ki
Li
)}
+
{
log
(∑N
k=1,k 6=j Kk∑N
k=1,k 6=j Lk
)
− log
(
Kj
Lj
)}]
Cultural determinants include having a common language (COMLANGij), being a part of
the same colonial set-up (COLONYij), having a common colonizer (COMCOLij), having
common legal origins (COMLAWij) and being a part of the same country in the past
(SAMECTRYij). More importantly from the perspective of this paper, we also control for
the level of services regulation in the dyad (SREGij, which is the sum of the logs of STRIi
and STRIj) and regulatory heterogeneity between partners by including the absolute value
of the diﬀerence between the logs of STRI of both countries (DREGij).
Finally, to examine the role of embedded supply chains in the region and complementarities
between goods and services trade, we also include the log of average merchandise trade
between countries i and j (BTGij) as an additional explanatory variable.
The testable propositions from Baier and Bergstrand (2004) are likely to be similar for STA
membership as well. Thus:
6
(a) Countries are more likely to negotiate accords with geographically-closer economies,
though the eﬀect of distance is likely to be benign for services traded over the internet.
(b) Similar and larger economically-sized countries are also likely to gain more due to the
exploitation of economies of scale and the presence of greater varieties ﬂowing from deeper
integration in services markets.
(c) The greater the diﬀerence in relative factor endowments between countries, and the larger
the intercontinental trade costs, the more trade creation is likely to be.
(d) The greater the diﬀerence in relative factor endowments between potential partners and
the ROW, the more likely trade diversion becomes.
(e) Dyads with common cultural factors and homogeneity in regulation are more likely to
enter into agreements as are partners with low initial barriers to services trade.
(f) Partners with high levels of existing bilateral trade in goods are also more likely to
negotiate STAs, not least because the intensity of such trade (and the competitiveness of
goods exporters) stands to be enhanced through a negotiated lowering of services input costs.
In estimating equation (1), we thus expect the coeﬃcients of SRGDPij, DKLij, SQDKLij,
BTGij, and the cultural variables to be positive while those ofDISTij,DRGDPij,DROWKLij,
SREGij, and DREGij to be negative.
6 Data
Data on trade agreements are taken from the WTO's Regional Trade Agreements Infor-
mation System database, where STA = 1 for agreements notiﬁed under Article V of the
GATS up until August 2015 and 0 otherwise. With the exception of the People's Republic
of China (PRC), the STRI for all countries in our sample relates to 2008. Since regulatory
convergence is an objective of services preferentialism, to minimize endogeneity in our esti-
mation emanating from reverse causality we only consider services accords that came into
eﬀect in 2008 or later5. The STRI for the PRC pertains to 2011. However, the PRC has
only concluded one services accord to date (with Pakistan) amongst our sample of Asian
countries since January 2008, which is unlikely to inﬂuence either its STRI considerably or
this paper's overall results.
5Only two services agreements were negotiated between Asian economies prior to 2008: JapanMalaysia
(2006) and JapanThailand (2007). Our sample size thus remains eﬀectively the same even without these
two agreements.
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The earliest STA involving at least one Asian partner (New ZealandSingapore) entered into
eﬀect on 1 January 2001. Since trade agreements are typically phased in over multi-year
transition periods and to control for potential endogeneity in our estimation, our data on the
time-varying independent variables are averages over 1979-1981 centered on 1980. The choice
of this early year is also likely to control for any domino eﬀects that the earliest STAs may
have exerted on the recent wave of services preferentialism involving Asian economies. As
robustness checks, however, we also include data on the time-varying independent variables
averaged over 1989-1991 and 1999-2001 in separate regressions6.
The Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII) gravity dataset
(Head et al. 2010) provides geographic distances between capital cities, used to compute
DISTij. Data on real GDP are taken from the World Bank's World Development Indicators
(WDI) and these are used to calculate SRGDPij and DRGDPij.
We approximate the relative factor endowment ratios Ki/Li by using data on real per capita
income (PCY ) for two reasons. One, using the perpetual inventory method to estimate cap-
ital stocks as in Baier and Bergstrand (2004) in earlier time periods leads to an unjustiﬁable
loss of observations. Two, real per-capita incomes are highly correlated with capital-labour
ratios (see Egger & Larch 2008; Bergstrand et al. 2010). Data on real PCY are also taken
from the WDI.
Data on common language and colonial antecedents are taken from the CEPII gravity dataset
(Head et al. 2010), while those on legal origins are compiled using Shleifer (1999)7. To the
extent possible, all trade data were also averaged over 1979-1981 to minimize ﬂuctuations in
recording practices8. Data on BTGij were sourced from UN Comtrade.
Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 2.
<Insert Table 2 here>
7 Results
The results from the LPM and Probit estimation of equation (1), assuming exogenous uni-
lateral STRI, are reported in Table 3. In the ﬁrst two columns of Table 3, the time-varying
regressors are averaged over 1979-1981. In columns (3) and (4), the time-varying regressors
6We would like to thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
7http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/ﬁles/qgov_web.xls
8In some cases, the earliest available years were 198486 (PRC), 19982000 (Mongolia and Viet Nam),
and 200002 (Cambodia).
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are averaged over 1989-1991, while in columns (5) and (6), these are averaged over 1999-2001.
Standard errors are clustered by trading partner pair in all speciﬁcations.
<Insert Table 3 here>
Unfortunately with data on time-varying regressors averaged over 1979-1981, the small num-
ber of observations meant that the Probit model was left with no degrees of freedom to
contend with. We thus focus on the LPM results reported in column (1). These results
suggest that only BTGij and DREGij were statistically signiﬁcant determinants of STA
membership in Asia for this earliest time period. Moreover, while the coeﬃcient of BTGij is
positive as predicted, that of DREGij is also positive, which runs counter to our predictions.
The latter suggests that Asian trading partners with divergent regulatory frameworks may
in fact be negotiating services accords to foster regulatory convergence. The explanatory
power of the LPM was also found to be high at 0.8264.
The results from the LPM with data on time-varying explanatory variables averaged over
1989-1991 reported in column (3) were qualitatively similar to those reported in column (1),
though the positive coeﬃcient of BTGij was now found to be weakly signiﬁcant. Moreover,
being a part of the same country in the past seemed to have a negative impact on the
propensity to negotiate services accords in Asia.
The Probit results reported in column (4) provided evidence for the positive role of BTGij,
DREGij, and having a common colonizer (COMCOLij) but the negative role of a common
legal system (COMLAWij) in determining STA membership in Asia. Signiﬁcantly, the
Probit model correctly predicted STA membership for 94.2% of the observations in our
sample9. Of the total, fourteen dyads actually negotiated an STA and nine of these were
correctly predicted by our model. The remaining 89 dyads did not have a services accord
and our model correctly predicted 88 (98.9%) of these.
With data on time-varying regressors averaged over 1999-2001, more explanatory variables
exhibit statistical signiﬁcance in the LPM and Probit results reported in columns (5) and
(6) respectively, but some of these results are also more counter-intuitive. For instance, the
coeﬃcient of DISTij is positive (thus negating the role of geography in the choice of STA
partners within Asia) and that of SRGDPij is negative (thereby negating the role of the
economic size of potential markets) in the Probit results in column (6), both of which run
counter to theoretical predictions in Baier & Bergstrand (2004). Given that the underlying
9To enable this comparison, we used the decision-rule from Baier and Bergstrand (2004). If STApredij >
0.5, then we take this value to be 1. If STApredij <=0, then we take this value to be 0.
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data on time-varying regressors has been averaged over 1999-2001 in these results, potential
endogeneity in estimation cannot be ruled out.
We thus focus on the results reported in columns (1) through (4) to explain STA membership
in Asia and these results suggest that trading partner pairs with greater historical levels of
bilateral merchandise trade and wider diﬀerences in their services regulatory frameworks are
more likely candidates for STA formation in Asia. Thus, the serviciﬁcation hypothesis
appears to command the strongest empirical appeal in explaining our sample countries'
propensities to sign services accords.
7.1 Endogenous unilateral STRI
In this sub-section, we relax the assumption of the exogeneity of the services regulatory
frameworks.
The main objective of STAs is to increase trade in services between partners. Reducing
levels of restrictive regulation and promoting regulatory convergence are important channels
through which services accords expand services trade volumes. Thus, the determinants of a
country's choice to negotiate a services accord are likely to be indistinguishable from those
that inform whether certain countries are more likely candidates for a reduction in restrictive
regulation as well as for regulatory convergence.
To examine this secondary hypothesis, in distinct regressions, we explain the restrictiveness
of services regimes in a dyad and regulatory heterogeneity between partners using the same
set of controls as used for explaining STA membership in equation (1).
Formally,
DREGij = θ + pix+ ε (2)
where DREGij is the absolute value of the diﬀerence between the logs of the services trade
restrictiveness index (STRI) of two countries and ε is an error term.
Moreover,
SREGij = µ+ ϕx+ ξ (3)
where SREGij is the sum of the log levels of STRI of two countries and ξ is an error term.
We then use the predicted values of DREGij and SREGij from equations (2) and (3), re-
spectively, as additional control variables in equation (1). Statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients
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of DREGpredij and SREG
pred
ij would suggest that these variables were endogenous in explain-
ing STA membership, thereby validating our secondary hypothesis. Equations (2) and (3)
were estimated using OLS but these results are not reported.
The results from the LPM and Probit estimation of equation (1), testing for the endogenous
treatment of STRI, are reported in Table 4. Once again, the time-varying regressors are
averaged over 1979-1981 in the ﬁrst two columns of Table 4. In columns (3) and (4), the
time-varying regressors are averaged over 1989-1991, while in columns (5) and (6), these
are averaged over 1999-2001. Standard errors are clustered by trading partner pair in all
speciﬁcations.
<Insert Table 4 here>
While the overall results from these regressions are qualitatively similar to those reported
in Table 3, the coeﬃcient of DREGpredij is omitted while that of SREG
pred
ij is statistically
indiﬀerent from zero, thereby pointing to the validity of the exogenous treatment of the
services regulatory frameworks in our baseline estimations of equation (1). This is also
conﬁrmed by the p-values of the parameter tests reported at the end of Table 4.
8 Conclusion
This paper explored the question of whether certain countries within Asia are more likely
candidates for negotiated regulatory convergence and harmonization in the context of services
agreements. The two papers closest to the analysis on oﬀer in this paper are Baier and
Bergstrand (2004), who were the ﬁrst to ask this question from the perspective of agreements
focusing on goods trade, and Cole and Guillin (2015), who ﬁrst explored the issue for services
accords without, however, considering the inﬂuence of regulation in services trade.
While our results may be Asia-speciﬁc, the goodness-of-ﬁt of our empirical model, demon-
strated by the probabilities predicted successfully, is in line with the results found in Baier
and Bergstrand (2004) and improve on those found in Cole and Guillin (2015).
Our results suggest that Asian economies with high pre-existing levels of bilateral goods
trade and divergent services regulatory frameworks are more likely to negotiate services
agreements with each other.
A number of policy implications can be derived from the above results. For starters, far from
inhibiting the quest for deeper market integration, ex ante divergences in regulatory regimes
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and enforcement capacities may well prove a signiﬁcant spur to negotiated convergence,
allowing parties to import best trade- and investment-facilitating standards from partners
with greater overall regulatory eﬃciency. Where regulatory divergences are so marked as
to inhibit market integration, the supply of adequate doses of variable geometry in meeting
otherwise common policy objectives may represent a useful means to promote convergence.
A case in point is ASEAN where, despite far-reaching income and development gaps within
the regional grouping, signiﬁcant regulatory convergence has been achieved through formulas
that internalize the need for diﬀerentiated implementation modalities across members.
Among economic variables, the positive and signiﬁcant relationship found between past
bilateral trade ﬂows and STA membership in Asia clearly stands out. This may lend support
to the idea that bindings in the area of services are increasingly perceived by governments
as important instruments to complement goods trade. This has particular resonance in Asia
given the growing insertion of the region in supply chain production. Producer services (e.g.,
transportation and logistics, telecommunications, ﬁnance, business and professional services)
play a signiﬁcant role in goods-dominated supply chains, and legally bound commitments in
treaty instruments (governing both trade and investment) assume heightened value as they
provide a degree of predictability and stability that is essential for the proper functioning of
complex cross-border operations (Baldwin and Kawai, 2013; Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez,
2013).
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Table 1: Comparison of STRI across regions/groups
Region/Group LAC ECA EAP OECD SSA SA MENA World
Mean 21.6 18.8 39.1 19.1 32.0 43.9 45.2 28.3
Standard deviation 10.0 6.7 13.9 4.8 16.6 13.7 11.2 14.9
Note: EAP = East Asia and the Paciﬁc, ECA = Eastern Europe and Central Asia, LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean,
MENA = Middle East and North Africa, OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, SA = South
Asia, SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa.
Source: Author calculations based on World Bank STRI database (Borchert et al. 2012).
Table 2: Descriptive statistics
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Table 3: Explaining STA membership within Asia, assuming exogenous unilateral STRI
Note: Levels of signiﬁcance: #10% * 5% **1% ***0.1%; standard errors, clustered by trading partner pair, reported in
parentheses; LPM = Linear Probability Model.
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Table 4: Explaining STA membership within Asia, allowing for endogenous unilateral
STRI
Note: Levels of signiﬁcance: #10% * 5% **1% ***0.1%; standard errors, clustered by trading partner pair, reported in
parentheses; LPM = Linear Probability Model.
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